IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA CASE NO: 502015CA000086XXXXMB AA

MAR-A-LAGO CLUB, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability corporation,

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Plaintiff,
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- vs -

PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision under the law of the state of Florida and BRUCE PELLY, individually,

Defendants.

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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE HONORABLE RICHARD L. OFTEDAL

DATE: October 2, 2015

TIME: 8:59 a.m. - 10:08 a.m.

APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:

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BE IT REMEMBERED, that the following proceedings were taken in the above-styled cause Before Honorable Richard Oftedal at the Palm Beach County Courthouse, 205 N. Dixie Highway, Room 10-B in the City of West Palm Beach, County of Palm Beach, state of Florida on the 2nd of October, 2015, to wit:
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THE COURT: Okay. So we're all here on Mar-A-Largo
and Palm Beach County, correct?
MS. PETRICK: Correct.
MR. ROGOW: Yes.
THE COURT: First order of business, I will just have everybody make their appearances for the record, please.

MR. ROGOW: For the Plaintiffs, Bruce Rogow, John Marion and Jeremy Bertsch.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. PILSK: And for the Defendant, Eric Pilsk and Amy Petrick.

THE COURT: Thank you. I will tell you all that $I$ think that I have done my homework. It was a lot of reading material, but $I$ think that $I$ read through it all as well as some case law that you cited.

I think I'm pretty much up to speed as to what the issues are, so don't feel that you need to repeat everything that you have written. I believe this is the County's motion, so why don't you proceed.

MR. PILSK: Thank you, Your Honor.
As you say, we're here on the County and Mr. Pelly's motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The plaintiff has alleged claims in general that it's been injured by aircraft flying over Mar-A-Largo. It pleads claims of public nuisance, trespass, inverse condemnation
and breach of contract, and also seeks injunctive remedy for the nuisance and trespass claims.

Under the guise of these claims, the plaintiff seeks to redesign the departure procedures of Palm Beach International Airport, to minimize noise impacts upon its property, and seeks to enrich itself $\$ 100$ million in damages.

In order to justify this relief, plaintiff makes the outrageous and absolutely false claim that the airport director is using undue influence to compel FAA air traffic controllers to direct aircraft -- to deviate aircraft from the normal departure procedures and fly directly over Mar-A-Largo in a personal attack on plaintiff's principal, Mr. Trump.

These claims are frankly ridiculous and simply designed to harass the County and Mr. Pelly. For the record, we vehemently deny these allegations. We'll state for the record that FAA traffic controllers alone control the airport departing and arriving at the airport pursuant to long-standing procedures and the airport director cannot and does not influence those procedures at all.

On a motion to dismiss however, we don't need to resolve that issue. The fact is that none of plaintiff's claims survive legal scrutiny even at the pleadings
stage.
Most of the claims -- all of the clams are asserted against both defendants, so to try to break this up in a more efficient way, what I would like to do first is address the two claims where each of the defendants have slightly different responses.

Those are the inverse condemnation and the breach of contract claim, and then I'll come back and deal with the claims where the responses are in common.

First on behalf of Mr. Pelly, the law is clear and plaintiffs don't dispute that there is no inverse condemnation claim against an individual. Employees, even of states and state agencies, do not have the power of eminent domain.

Accordingly, the claim for inverse condemnation against Mr. Pelly simply can't stand as a matter of law and that should be dismissed. Frankly dismiss it with prejudice because there is simply no way to assert that claim against an individual.

On the breach of contract claim against Mr. Pelly, the claim -- excuse me, the claim alleges a breach of contract for failure to achieve maximum adherence to the preferred flight tracks, and that is in the amended complaint in Paragraph 85.

The plain terms of the settlement agreement
demonstrate that Mr. Pelly was not required to achieve maximum adherence to the flight tracks or was he prohibited from doing anything regarding the flight tracks.

The language about the maximum adherence is in Paragraph 10 of the amended complaint, and that's attached as Exhibit $A$ to the amended complaint. I have a copy if Your Honor would like to follow along.

THE COURT: I'm good. Go ahead.
MR. PILSK: Okay. Thank you.
Paragraph 10 of the settlement agreement starts by acknowledge that the County has always taken the position that it has no authority. Both parties acknowledge that the County's position is that the County has no authority or capability to enforce the flight procedures, and that adherence to an enforcement of said procedures is the legal obligation solely of the FAA and the airlines operating aircraft at PBIA.

Paragraph 10 then goes on to provide in an effort to attempt to encourage the greatest adherence possible to those flight procedures, the County shall take certain actions.

Then it specifies three specific actions that the County must undertake which are basically reporting requirements, two of which expired years ago.

THE COURT: Mr. Pelly was a signatory to the settlement agreement, right?

MR. PILSK: He was a signatory to the settlement agreement, but the obligations they allege here do not go to Mr. Pelly, they're obligations of the County.

In fact, the only allegation of Mr . Pelly was to sign the release documents, which he did, and there is no obligation to the contrary.

The specific claim of breach they allege simply does not go against Mr. Pelly. There is no basis to assert that it does. The contract says what it says. It's very clear. As a matter of law Your Honor can see that and dismiss the claim.

THE COURT: Let's talk about the County then.
MR. PILSK: Okay. On the County's side of the breach of contract claim it's actually very similar. Their claim as asserted is that the County has failed to adhere to maximum adherence to the flight procedure -- to the departure procedures.

Again, the plain language of the contract does not require that. It requires three specific things to encourage maximum adherence to the flight track. There is no allegation that the County failed to do any of those things.

Instead, the allegation is more open-ended that it
hasn't done other things that might also have the effect of encouraging compliance with the flight tracks. There simply is no claim -- there is no claim alleged that they have breached -- the County has breached any allegation of the contract.

THE COURT: Aren't they taking the position that the County has taken action to have the flights fly close to Mar-A-Largo, and that in itself is a violation of the settlement agreement?

MR. PILSK: None of the obligations prohibit the County from doing that. Just within the four corners of the settlement agreement, nothing in the settlement agreement prohibits the County from doing it.

Again, the only obligation regarding -- sorry.
THE COURT: What about the plaintiff points out in their response that the settlement agreement states that the intent of this agreement is to attempt to achieve maximum adherence to the preferred flight tracks.

And the agreement also states that the County, the Club and Trump wish to take measures to encourage the FAA to enforce a strict adherence to the preferred flight tracks.

MR. PILSK: Certainly those are quotes. Those are correct, but Paragraph 10 --

THE COURT: Doesn't that impose any obligations upon
the County in that regard or is that language just aspirational language?

MR. PILSK: That specific language is aspirational. The operative language in Paragraph 10 is specific. First of all, it's to encourage maximum adherence not to achieve maximum adherence.

Secondly, it sets forth specific obligations that the parties said this is how you will fulfill that obligation. These are the three reporting requirements specified in Paragraphs $10-\mathrm{A}, \mathrm{B}$ and C .

Those are the only obligations for adherence to the flight procedures. There are I think eight other obligations set forth in the County -- that the County is obligated to under the contract.

Again, none of them require an open-ended obligation to achieve maximum adherence to the flight tracks or do anything other than what is specified. You see these are -- if you look this is in the previous pages of the paragraph under County actions.

It's conduct studies, to work with the FAA, to outline an aggressive close and departure procedure, issue a letter of airmen, a whole series of basically reporting actions that were taken years ago, but not an open-ended obligation to do everything to achieve maximum adherence.

Again, on the face of the four corners of the complaint there is no claims -- there is no obligation of the County to do everything in its power or in fact, anything other than what is specifically identified to encourage adherence to the departure procedures.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PILSK: Now, turning to the claims where the defenses are in common. This is the trespass - I will start with the trespass and nuisance claims.

I want to start with the real core of their allegations here on the undue influence. There is no real argument, and the law is very clear, that there is no nuisance claims for an airport that's operating lawfully in accordance with its ordinary and customary manner.

Similarly, there is no -- the law is very clear that a trespass -- there is no trespass action if someone is using the property of another under a claim of right or under a right to use it.

Plaintiffs here try to get around that clear law by arguing that the airport director is using undue influence to compel the FAA air traffic controllers to deviate from the normal departure procedures and fly over Mar-A-Largo.

Now, to put this claim in context, I want to keep
looking at the settlement agreement which is attached to the complaint as an exhibit, and therefore, part of the four corners of the complaint for purposes of the motion to dismiss.

Look at the whereas clause because they outline the history of the flight procedures at the airport that puts this claim in context. I'm looking first on page four of the settlement agreement that talks about the -- the whereas clause that talks about the development of flight procedures. It's part of a public Part 150 process to develop a noise compatibility program.

Mr. Trump at the time objected to the procedures, objected to the runway heading procedures that's currently in place that would have aircraft going about 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo.

It refers to the fact that the FAA issues the orders and the FAA enforces those orders. It specifies the current flight path on the runway heading 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo. It also acknowledges that notwithstanding the preferred flight track due to wind, weather and other causes, some transport category aircraft that are departing and arriving at PBIA are varying from the preferred flight track including some aircraft that may be flying in close proximity or directly over Mar-A-Largo or to the south of Mar-A-Largo.

Then we get to the language that you quoted earlier, Your Honor, that the County and Trump and the Club wish to take measures to encourage the FAA to enforce a strict adherence to the preferred flight track as safety will allow.

Then it recites the County's position that the County does not control or enforce the flight tracks. The point of this is that as long as early as 20 years ago, aircraft were following flight path procedures that departed on the runway heading from PBIA approximately 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo and that due to wind, weather and other factors aircraft deviated from that procedure and overflew Mar-A-Largo.

There is nothing knew about this. This is part of the customary and legal usage and customary practices at the airport. The gist of the complaint here is that notwithstanding that, notwithstanding that history, that something has changed.

That something isn't wind, weather or air traffic control instructions, it's this undue influence by the airport director. In support of that frankly counter-factual assertion because we know plaintiffs effectively concede that aircraft always overflew Mar-A-Largo.

Plaintiffs offer no real facts. There is just this
conclusory assertion that the airport director has used undue influence to somehow compel the FAA air traffic controllers to do this and it somehow made the FAA air traffic controllers agents of the County.

There is no statement of what this influence is, of how it is exercised, who he might have talked to or called, how he influenced other people. Much less how it was exercised, not just over one individual, there is not just one air traffic controller up there, there is an entire staff and supervisors and managers, a whole network of people who manage the flight procedures at PBIA.

No facts whatsoever to link their speculative surmise only because aircraft are overflying Mar-A-Largo there must be some nefarious plot to explain it instead of what the history shows, which is that aircraft have always overflown Mar-A-Largo from time to time due to wind, weather and other factors.

The Florida Supreme Court and Flo-Sun make clear that kind of conclusory pleading when you're talking about a complicit, if not conspiracy, among numerous public officials to advocate their own responsibilities in order to achieve some sort of public or inflict a public nuisance or harm against an individual is simply not sufficient.

Not under a heightened pleading standard, but under a notice pleadings standard itself. As stated, this conclusory allegation is simply not sufficient to survive review in a motion to dismiss.

Even apart from that, turning to the nuisance claim first, as we have laid out in the complaint, the FAA and the federal government have exclusive control over the navigable airspace. They have exclusive sovereignty over the airspace and exclusive control over air traffic controller procedures.

The County has no legal role in that process. Pilots are required to obey the FAA air traffic controller's instructions. Everything that happens with departing aircraft is in the hands of either the pilot or the FAA. If the pilots are following FAA instructions, they're obeying the law and the fights are taking off in a lawful manner.

There is simply no basis to conclude here that anything is -- on that fact alone, there is nothing unlawful about the way aircraft are flying because they're flying pursuant to FAA air traffic controller's instructions.

There is no allegation in the complaint that the air traffic controller's instructions themselves are improper or an abuse of discretion of the controllers.

Similarly on the trespass claim, the navigable airspace, including the airspace necessary for taking off and landing, is within the exclusive control of the United States. Aircraft have a right to use that to land and depart from airports under FAA control.

Aircraft operate there as a matter of right and there can't be a trespass as a matter of state law. Plaintiffs spend time in their brief trying to distinguish the various cases. We have talked about that in the papers.

The fact is they have cited no case where a trespass or nuisance action was found against an airport. For the very simple reason airports operate -- aircraft operate in the navigable airspace lawfully and properly as a matter of law. There simply is no claim under those two theories.

Finally, one more point with respect to nuisance and that is the special injury factor. You know, really I think the two parties have narrowed it down. We cite the Page (phonetic) case, an older supreme Court case that makes it very clear that when you're dealing with a sort of an atmospheric effect that is spread over a wide distance, that there is no special injury because really everybody is affected in the same manner.

They rely on the Surfside case that involves the
impacts on a particular piece of property by an adjacent municipal dump and draw the broad conclusion from that that any injury to property is per se a special injury that can support a claim for public nuisance.

I think that's the wrong rule to follow. I think the way to look at that is ask well, what would the remedy be and how we would enforce it. They ask for an injunction. If you issue an injunction to abate the nuisance to this plaintiff, you are just going to move the impact over to another property owner, and she is going to be in here asking for an junction to abate the nuisance.

You move it again, and there will be another property owner. It underscores two I think important points here. One, that there is no special injury because any property owner can make the same set of allegations and allege the same kind of harm from this alleged public nuisance. No ones is fundamentally different. There may be differences of degree, but not in kind.

THE COURT: When you say differences in degree so when the plaintiff goes at length in the complaint detailing all of these special attributes about this particular property, that it's a national landmark or all these other kind of things regarding the limestone and
the effect that it's having on there as being a unique piece of property, your position is that it's just what?

MR. PILSK: Those are particular attributes of those pieces of property. There is nothing to suggest that other properties don't have similar attributes and aren't similarly affected by the noise emissions and vibrations from the aircraft.

It's just the effect of the atmospheric pollution on their particular property, but it's affecting everyone in maybe just different degrees. Maybe their property is somewhat more susceptible than other properties, we don't know. They haven't alleged that no one else is affected in the same way. I don't think they can.

And I think that's still the problem is what makes them so particularly different in kind. And the law, that is the standard, different in kind, not just degree from others but --

THE COURT: I know it's under inverse condemnation, but what about the Foster $V$. City of Gainesville case they cite?

MR. PILSK: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I think that is more of an inverse condemnation.

THE COURT: Well, speak about that right now since it's on my mind.

MR. PILSK: Okay. Well, I think that the standard
in Florida for inverse condemnation is we have to show one of two things.

Either substantial ouster and depravation of all beneficial uses of the property or the aircraft invade the plaintiff's super-adjacent airspace causing direct and immediate interference with the use of the land.

Now, they don't plead substantial ouster and depravation as I understand it. I don't think they can. I mean it's operating -- it seems to be functioning pretty much fine from the pleadings. There hasn't been a substantial ouster.

On the second prong though they don't allege that the aircraft invades the super-adjacent airspace. Now, their response brief focuses on the fact that's not a requirement, but every case that is considered in any detail, the application of the general standard for inverse condemnation in the airport context has required that or found invasion of the super-adjacent airspace.

THE COURT: AS I understand it, and correct me if I'm wrong, but $I$ thought the plaintiff's position was that so long as there is a diminution in value that's satisfied the requirements for inverse condemnation?

MR. PILSK: In the airport context that may go to the second prong of substantial depravation, directly interfering with the use of the land, but not -- but they
still have to show diminution in airspace.
In the Foster case the flights were as low as 220 feet above the plaintiff's property. In Hillsborough County Aviation v. Benitez, the Court there found that the super-adjacent airspace was between 250 and 500 feet above sea level -- above ground, excuse me.

THE COURT: Well, the City of Gainesville case, and I'm just reading from the plaintiff's brief, argues that the residue from the airplanes covers everything in the yards, prevents them from hanging their clothes out to dry, cooking out, gardening and the vibrations from the flights caused cracked windows and the fan to separate from the ceiling in one of the homes.

There was a significant decrease in the value of the property, and that was found to apparently satisfy the requirements for an inverse condemnation. What is so different about that than what we have here that's alleged?

MR. PILSK: Well, first of all, they haven't alleged impacts or anything like that. I mean, they really have been general in nature. They talk about general interference and displeasure, but there is no specifics.

There is no indication of -- there is no testimony or rather pleadings about ash being distributed everywhere. There is no testimony --

THE COURT: I thought there were allegations about soot and the like that was --

MR. PILSK: Just generally that it falls, but no discussion of the impact that it has on the property other than the speculative allegation that it may be causing deterioration of the limestone.

This is no discussion of how it's impairing their use of the property, and I think that is really the key. There is no allegation that they're flying solo to avoid the super-adjacent airspace, which again in the Foster case, the flights were as low as 220 above the plaintiff's property.

THE COURT: Was that what Foster hinges on the fact that it was 220 feet? Would it make any difference if it was 1,000 feet?

MR. PILSK: I think it would under the standard if you're not in the super-adjacent airspace. If they're high above in what is clearly a public airspace and no part of the private airspace, there would be no taking under Florida law. It would just be an impact that wasn't compensable.

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry to distract you over to the inverse side.

MR. PILSK: No. That's fine. If you look at the other cases, you know, the Hillsborough County Aviation,
the noise from overflights frightened the plaintiff's children and pets, interrupted sleep, caused hearing damage, damaged the building and soot and made certain activities impossible.

THE COURT: What about the Young case, Young versus Palm Beach County?

MR. PILSK: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I don't have that one in front of me.

THE COURT: Get back maybe to the inverse condemnation because $I$ am concerned about this inverse condemnation claim.

It's cited in Young versus Palm Beach County the appellate court overturned dismissal of the complaint against the airport for inverse condemnation. The allegations in that complaint were the flights were made -- the flights made family and telephone conversations difficult and watching television difficult. If that's all that's necessary it seems to set a low bar for inverse condemnation, does it not? MR. PILSK: Well, again if you -- first you have the super-adjacent airspace requirement which is missing here.

Second, the complaint here really doesn't allege the kind of interference with the use that rises even to that level.

THE COURT: Well, that super-adjacent airspace issue, was that satisfied in the Young case?

MR. PILSK: Your Honor, I apologize but I don't have the altitude in front of me. I can get back to you on that if you would like?

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. PILSK: I think we have covered the substance of the argument on inverse condemnation. They have simply failed to plead both the invasion of the super-adjacent airspace in enough details and specifics of how their property has been harmed by the overflights to satisfy the interference and use prong of the test. Under both prongs the inverse condemnation claim fails to state a cause of action.

The final point then to make relates to the claim for injunctive relief. I understand it's somewhat unusual to seek to dismiss a claim for relief, but they pled them as separate counts.

THE COURT: So you're really moving to strike those?
MR. PILSK: Yes, Your Honor, for really two basic reasons.

One, an injunction to abate the nuisance in effect would be to stop the aircraft from flying over Mar-A-Largo, and that is clearly preempted. The federal government has exclusive control over
flight procedures and only the federal government can make changes to the flight procedures. The FAA and the federal government are not parties to this action. There is simply no authority for the County, or frankly for the Court, to order that kind of relief.

It really makes sense because, you know, if this Court can afford a remedy to a private plaintiff to make changes to the air traffic control system it effects not just plaintiff and not just other residents under the flight tracks, but more fundamentally it effects the ability of the FAA to control the flight path.

Then really where is the end of it at that point. Again, you make this one move for this plaintiff, there is another plaintiff that comes forward making similar claims, and you got to move it again.

Suddenly, the Palm Beach County circuit court is in charge of air traffic procedures not the FAA. It's simply preempted by federal law.

Similarly, it's contrary to the separation of powers doctrine really for very similar reasons. The decision not just of how to direct air traffic, but how to mitigate noise and how to address noise problems is fundamentally a legislative decision for the political branches, not something that the court -- for the judicial branch.

Really plaintiffs themselves make clear in their papers why their injunction claims are barred by this doctrine. They say the factors that are involved are beyond the technical aspects of how to get planes on or off the ground, but are more about how to spread the noise around or in this case concentrate it.

It really has little to do with policy evaluation involving the taking off and landing of aircraft. That's in their opposition at 18 .

This isn't about the technical aspects of taking off, it's about how to allocate the noise. That's really a legislative determination that has to be made by balancing the benefits of the airport and the impacts on different residences, and what is the most effective way to balance those benefits and impacts.

The fact is as made clear in the settlement agreement 20 years ago the County went through a very public process to elevate options and made a decision that is now memorialized in County ordinances.

This plaintiff comes in 20 years later and tries to reargue the policy arguments it lost 20 years ago in the guise of a private, nuisance and trespass action.

The net effect would simply be to shift the burdens from plaintiff to other residences in the area without even a legislative process, without any opportunity to be
heard or defend themselves.
This kind of balancing of harms and benefits and allocation of impacts is a matter for the legislative branch not for the judicial branch. The remedy they seek in injunctive relief is simply barred by the separation of powers doctrine.

I think, Your Honor, that covers my initial presentation unless you have any questions.

THE COURT: I will give you the last word.
MR. PILSK: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Rogow, good morning.
MR. ROGOW: Good morning, Judge. I think that like many cases you have to start with how one looks at it in the prism through which one tries to address these issues.

This is not the classic the airplanes are flying from the airport and they're disturbing me. This claim is that they have targeted Mar-A-Largo by virtue of $M r$. Pelly's actions influencing the people who are sending the planes out.

Let me start with the contract.
THE COURT: Can $I$ take you off track for just a second?

MR. ROGOW: Yes.
THE COURT: Since we're talking about Mr. Pelly, one
of the arguments is in terms of abateness and lacks specificity.

When I read the complaint, $I$ was at a little bit of a loss to understand what exactly, aside from the allegations of undue influence when it comes to the County and the FAA, what power hold does he have on the federal government?

I'm not sure I understand that when I read the complaint.

MR. ROGOW: He is the director of the airport so the airport operations are under his control. The flight patterns are not under his control, but our allegation is that Mr. Pelly, through his influence, through his efforts instead of complying with the --

THE COURT: What influence?
MR. ROGOW: Talking to the people that do -- sending out the flights. Fanning is really what we're after.

If they were fanning we wouldn't be in this situation. Mr. Pelly has communicated to the people, to the flight controllers that they shouldn't be fanning, they should be sending these planes out due east which then takes them over Mar-A-Largo.

So this allegation which we're making is based upon information that we have where we think that Mr . Pelly has influenced the flight patterns by his relationship
and his directorship of the airport.
Now, this is something that we're going to have to prove. If we can't prove it, then this case is lost on summary judgment.

That is what this case is about. There is no question Mr . Pelly is a signature to the agreement. I mean, the agreement in the first paragraph, the settlement agreement involves Mr. Pelly and says that he is a party to the agreement.

Then when one takes a look --
THE COURT: How do you respond to that because I think he's a signature only for another reason and that is that apparently he needed to be released as part of the prior lawsuit.

MR. ROGOW: Well, whatever his reasons are for being a party, he is a party.

In the agreement it talks about -- and Mr. Pelly obviously is an employee of the County and whatever the County is going to be doing here is it's going to be doing through Mr. Pelly.

The language is that the County will take measures to encourage the FAA to enforce as strict adherence to the preferred flight tracks as safety will allow. We already discussed that.

THE COURT: Reading that language does the County,
the Club and Trump wish to take measures to have the FAA to enforce a strict adherence to the preferred flight tracts. It doesn't say Pelly.

MR. ROGOW: Pelly is the County in this context in terms of dealing with the airport.

THE COURT: Then why name Pelly?
MR. ROGOW: Why not name Pelly, is that your question, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, my question is why name Pelly if the argument is -- well, Pelly is not named here. If it's the County, Pelly, the Club and Trump wish to take measures, it seems to me you would have a stronger argument.

It's simply limited to the County, the Club and Trump.

MR. ROGOW: That's correct.
THE COURT: You make it seem to argue that Pelly breached the agreement, that language.

MR. ROGOW: Because Pelly is responsible for carrying out the County's obligations vis-a-vie this agreement with the operation of the airport.

THE COURT: I mean, assuming that's true then wouldn't it be sufficient to simply name the County then as you said since Mr . Pelly is an agent who works for the County?

MR. ROGOW: Well, we have named obviously the County, so the County is still in no matter what. Pelly is an employee of the County. I think on the breach of contract argument --

THE COURT: What would you lose if Pelly fell out of the breach of contract?

MR. ROGOW: Nothing on the breach of contract. Nothing on the breach of contract. We can survive without Pelly in the breach of contract.

Our reading of the contract, and Pelly being a party to it and the obligation, the obligation is in paragraph eight. Again, it names the County. The County shall continue to support the fanning of the stage 2 aircraft under the procedures set forth.

Now, that is an important part of this agreement. The County shall continue to support the fanning. That is what we're talking about here because the answer is if the County did encourage that and continued to support it, then there would be no breach of contract, but that is the heart of our case.

THE COURT: The County says that's just aspirational language.

MR. ROGOW: Well, I don't see how it --
THE COURT: The real duties and obligations of the County are set forth and enumerated specifically in one
through eight or however many it is.
MR. ROGOW: But all of those duties are in pursuit of and in pursuance of this promise by the County to support the fanning and to encourage a maximum adherence.

What we have here is an allegation that they have done just the opposite. They have not supported and indeed they have discouraged it. So the antithesis of encouraging is discourage, and that is what our complaint alleges that they have discouraged.

If they have discouraged under this agreement then they have failed to discontinue to support the fanning, then they are in breach of this contract. That's the breach of contract claim.

I think all of this takes us to the important part that this is a targeted kind of action that we're talking about. All of these cases --

THE COURT: Can I just interrupt you once more?
MR. ROGOW: Yes.
THE COURT: I just want to get Mr. Pelly out of the way so we can concentrate on the County.

Likewise, do you need Pelly for your inverse condemnation claim?

MR. ROGOW: No.
THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROGOW: Many of the things that have been argued are issues of fact. Your Honor focused on the issue of fact, can we prove that Pelly did this.

For the purpose of this argument we have to assume that the allegations, take the allegations of the complaint as true and therefore, we're faced with what $I$ call a targeted kind of an action.

I guess you could frame it this way if one showed that an airport employee was able to achieve the direct flying over of your property, knowing that it was going to cause harm to the property, diminish the value, interfere with the enjoyment of the property, would you be able to state a cause of action.

That is what this case is about because we're not trying to effect how the FAA sends out planes except to the extent that we're alleging that the FAA is sending out these planes because of the acts of Mr. Pelly directly over Mar-A-Largo.

So the question is is does --
THE COURT: Is the argument that Mr. Pelly is in effect exercising some undue influence over the FAA? MR. ROGOW: Yes. Yes. That he is -- when I say undue influence, his actions -- that is the heart of this complaint.

His actions have caused the FAA -- and this is
something that we have to prove down the line, caused the FAA to not adhere to the fanning procedure but to have this targeted kind of impact upon Mar-A-Largo by virtue of these planes being sent off directly to the east and not being fanned out.

If they're fanned out -- the argument that's made about everybody would come here and complain, that is just not so. If they are fanned out under FAA procedures, then everybody is sharing the same noise, the same discomfort, if there is discomfort from that from people who are east of the airport.

That is not what this case is about.
THE COURT: Why isn't this argument being made to the FAA?

MR. ROGOW: Because in this situation we have an agreement with the County so the focus is on the County.

Will it reach the FAA at some point? I mean, we don't have to add all of the parties to a case at the beginning.

We focused on this because our position is is that the reason this is occurring is because the County has failed to abide by the contract, and Mr. Pelly has taken action that focuses these planes over Mar-A-Largo.

THE COURT: It's almost like an indispensable argument -- I mean, an indispensable party. It seems to
me that the County seems to be arguing that it's not Mr . Pelly, it's not even the County, it's the FAA who has this -- who is in charge of making these kinds of decisions.

So joining the County or joining Mr. Pelly is meaningless without having control over the FAA.

MR. ROGOW: Well, they haven't moved to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party.

THE COURT: They haven't used those words, but it's almost that kind of argument they're making to me.

MR. ROGOW: You know, like in any case it's an incremental process. I mean, we have a contract here. I understand what their ultimate defense is going to be, it's not us, the FAA is making the decision.

We will see what the proof shows with regard to that. The FAA, no question about it, the air traffic controllers do make decisions, but if the air traffic controller's decisions are being influenced by or even directed by Mr. Pelly, then Mr. Pelly and the County have responsibilities.

THE COURT: Was there any kind of smoking gun here for this?

I mean, is there some kind of memo, e-mail from Mr. Pelly to the air traffic controllers telling them we want you to fly these planes deliberately or direct these
planes directly over Mr. Trump's property?
Is there anything like that?
MR. ROGOW: I don't have it in hand now. I hope to have it as the case progresses. We have information from people at the airport who have given us information that we believe supports this claim.

Mr. Marion, I think wanted to address...
MR. MARION: Can I speak for a moment?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. MARION: I hate to interrupt Mr. Rogow's argument, but we have talked to the air traffic managers.

Just so you know, the FAA doesn't care where you take off and land. They don't give a hoot about that. What they care about is whether or not your flight tracks are safe.

They have had flight tracks all over the County off the airport runway in the past. They're all safe and they're all approved by the FAA, but the airport proprietor, Bruce Pelly in this instance, has a great deal of influence over the FAA.

He can call the FAA on the federal level and say $I$ want to fly these flights directly off the runway and straight east and as long as it's safe, the FAA is going to say fine.

The County or the airport proprietor has an
obligation to the citizens around the airport to fan noise abatement. Under the statutes and the regulations that is their obligation.

If Mr. Pelly decides that he just wants to run that aircraft straight over Mar-A-Largo, he can do it. As long as the FAA says it's safe, they will approve it.

What we're saying is that we have talked to people that will assist us in proving that we only fly straight over Mar-A-Largo. We don't fly it anywhere else anymore, and that's in violation of the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: So is the assertion that we don't fly it anywhere else, we only fly it over Mar-A-Largo because Mr. Pelly tells us only to fly it over Mar-A-Largo, is that essentially the argument?

MR. MARION: The FAA?
THE COURT: No, I mean --
MR. MARION: The County?
THE COURT: I mean you say people.
MR. MARION: I have talked to people and that's where the flights are.

THE COURT: Is that what they're saying that Mr. Pelly is telling them ignore the fanning and just send these planes right over Mar-A-Largo?

MR. MARION: What we have alleged is what we believe we can prove, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, what I'm hearing here seems to go beyond what I have read in the complaint as far as the allegations are concerned.

MR. MARION: The factual evidence may well go beyond that, Judge. We have pled a bare minimum amount to get this thing going.

You know, if we're foreclosed from going and proving what we think we can prove, that will be a travesty. THE COURT: I'm just not sure that the language again that $I$ see in the complaint, which generally is conclusory in nature, undue influence, these kinds of things, whether that is sufficient.

Now, again what I'm hearing here goes beyond that. Maybe had those things been alleged in the complaint, maybe that would satisfy the County's requirement for specificity and the Courts.

MR. ROGOW: Your Honor, the Flo-Sun case, which is a case they cite for the lack of specificity, has to do with the sugar cane out in West Palm Beach County. There was an administrative remedy.

This was a suit -- I think Governor Kirk brought the suit and it ended up before the Supreme Court. I don't think that that is a measure of what is necessary in order to stay the claim.

I mean, our claim is a narrow claim.

THE COURT: There is also these undue influences, isn't that entirely conclusory?

MR. ROGOW: No. It says deliberate and malicious that he has directed this to happen.

So in terms of how much do you have to put into a complaint in order to state the cause of action, clearly the elements here of nuisance, trespass and inverse condemnation are met. The answer to Your Honor's question is about Young, and it doesn't talk at all about adjacent properties.

THE COURT: I was going to ask you about that.
MR. ROGOW: It doesn't. It doesn't mention that.
Again, it's not necessary because that is not the nature of this case. This case is a focused case about targeted actions.

I mean, as $I$ started at the beginning in terms of the construct here, if there were targeted actions saying fly these planes, and indeed if he could do it. Now, we get back to the ultimate issue.

That's why $I$ said that we're going to have to prove this, and if we don't prove this, there is no case. But if he said to the FAA people, $I$ want you to fly these planes directly east and they did because of the reasons Mr. Marion talked about, they don't care as long as it's going in a safe way.

If he did that and then it caused the damages that we have alleged, we have stated a cause of action. The question Your Honor is asking is whether or not we can prove the cause of action, but that is the next step in this case.

THE COURT: Well, again, I'm not necessarily asking whether you can prove it. I understand the difference. I'm simply asking from a pleading standpoint are the allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, that is, are they alleged with requisite specificity that is required?

There has got to be some specificity. And what I'm troubled with, as I indicated to you, is simply whether allegations such as directed or undue influence, whether those are sufficient or not.

I mean, obviously you take the position that they are?

MR. ROGOW: Well, certainly directing, certainly deliberate, certainly malicious, those are specific terms that are tied into what we have alleged he has done and the overarching thing that we allege is that he has directed through the FAA, through his influence with the FAA, to have these planes flying directly over Mar-A-Largo.

THE COURT: What influence does he have?

MR. ROGOW: He runs the airport. The relationship between the FAA and the airport, of course, is intertwined.

THE COURT: So it's almost like he has the same influence $I$ guess as any airport director, right?

MR. ROGOW: Well, I can't speak for any airport director. He has been the airport director for a long time.

There is no question that the airport works hand in hand with the federal government, with the FAA in running the airport. There are different interests at stake. The FAA's interest is getting these planes out and flight safety.

Mr. Pelly's interest are different in terms of the operation of the airport. Certainly noise is an issue for the County. There is no question that this area of noise abatement and noise concern is not preempted. I mean there are cases. Fort Lauderdale Airport has it all the time now on what they do to try to abate noise, but that's in a general concept.

That is the difference in this case. This is a specific concept. We're not saying that we want to have a hand in how they decide to fan the aircraft as the aircraft leaves Palm Beach Airport. What we're saying is the aircraft cannot be sent out over Mar-A-Largo because

Mr. Pelly is achieving that result in violation of the County's contract, in violation of his obligations we think in terms of noise abatement.

THE COURT: Are you seeking the complete prohibition of any aircraft flying over Mar-A-Largo?

MR. ROGOW: Pardon me?
THE COURT: Are you seeking the prohibition of any aircraft flying over Mar-A-Largo?

MR. ROGOW: No. No. No. No. That's not the point of this at all. It goes back to fanning.

THE COURT: How many planes can fly over Mar-A-Largo?
MR. ROGOW: How many?
THE COURT: Yes. In your view what would be the permissible amount?

It seems to me you're saying well, there are too many. They can fly some planes, but they're directing too many planes over Mar-A-Largo, we want less planes.

MR. ROGOW: We want a procedure that takes care of the aircraft leaving in a fair way that spreads whatever noise or discomfort there may be among all the community that is served by the airport.

I can't tell you that $I$ want 10 planes or 15 planes, but if there is fanning because fanning is the answer. That's the reason there is such a thing as fanning. The planes get sent out in a way that doesn't concentrate the
noise, the vibrations, the obnoxious fumes in one area. That's what this complaint is about, that is what has happened now. The question is why is it happening. Our complaint alleges that it's happening because Mr . Pelly, as an agent of the County, has caused this to occur.

That is really all our complaint is about. So the remedy is not to prohibit planes from flying over Mar-A-Largo because we can't do that. We simply can't do that.

The remedy is what is mentioned in paragraph eight of the agreement, fanning. So if they have discouraged that, the opposite of encouraging, if they have failed to support that by the actions of Mr . Pelly, then we have stated a claim.

The Foster case, the Gainesville case, obviously they're talking about damage that is measured by the lack of failure to be able to use the property. That, of course, is a situation that is different from ours.

Ours is a stronger argument because our argument is that the damage here is directed to Mar-A-Largo. It's not a general airport claim. But if you had a general airport claim that could give rise to an inverse condemnation, obviously the Foster versus City of Gainesville case supports that.

The Young case supports that and reverses the case that was dismissed on the complaint because it does state a cause of action. Is it a trespass, yes. Is it inverse condemnation, yes. Is it a breach of contract, yes, if we can prove these things.

THE COURT: Okay. Are there any cases that - and maybe there are and I just missed them or I don't recall them in your brief that have upheld injunctive relief of the sort that you're requesting?

MR. ROGOW: I don't know of any case off the top of my head that does that, but here is the other problem, Judge.

There aren't any cases that have the targeted claim that we have. All of these airport cases are people being disturbed by the general operation of the airport. That is not what we are talking about. We are talking about people being harmed by the specific acts of the airport director leading to this kind of damage.

Assuming we can prove this, could there be an injunction against Mr. Pelly, against the County to enjoin them from interfering with the fanning procedure? I mean, thinking ahead as this case would play out, let's assume the FAA people say Pelly told us to fly it directly east and we're doing it because it works, it's not a problem for us except it is a problem in terms of
what the consequences are.
So if the FAA people say we'll fan, it's not a problem for us, then the injunction would be aimed at the County saying don't interfere with the fanning.

That's really where we want to get back to.
THE COURT: I guess I'm still not exactly sure if you were granted the relief that you're requesting in your counts for injunctive relief, what would actually the County be prohibited from doing and would that of itself, without the assistance or cooperation of the FAA, grant you the relief that you're requesting?

MR. ROGOW: It would. If the FAA says look, fanning is fine with us and that is what we -- that's what we would perhaps prefer to do, but for whatever reason we have been sending them off directly east over Mar-A-Largo because this is what Pelly wanted.

So if the injunction tells the County that you cannot do that, that you have to support fanning, you cannot discourage maximum adherence, then we would have been successful.

Then we would be back to fanning. That's where we are. I think what happens is when one looks at this, we're saying that we don't want the planes flying over Mar-A-Largo. We can't say that. We can't control that. I agree we can't control that.

THE COURT: Again, if you were granted this injunctive relief, what would that require? Would that then make $M r$. Pelly get on the phone with the FAA and say change things now?

MR. ROGOW: It would require him to get off of the phone with the FAA and not direct them to do what they're doing which is the source of our complaint.

Basically, leave it to the FAA. I mean, the question you asked is should the FAA be in here somehow or other. The answer is if --

THE COURT: I'm wondering if you can get the relief that you wanted without the FAA?

MR. ROGOW: Yes. Yes. If the case, as it pans out, shows that the FAA does view fanning as a method of minimizing the kind of discomfort that's caused by airport noise, and that is what they would usually do and Mr. Pelly and the County are then prohibited from interfering with the FAA's processes and planning of airplanes, then we would have the remedy that we want.

I mean, the remedy that we want is to stop the County from interfering with what the FAA's fanning procedures are. That is the heart of what we have alleged, that he has interfered with that.

If he has interfered with that and the consequence of that interference is the planes are now flying over

Mar-A-Largo, then stopping the County and Mr. Pelly from that interference would achieve the results that we want.

I mean, I hope that I make this very clear that we are not controlling what the FAA -- or seeking to control what the FAA does. There will be times when the FAA will send them directly over Mar-A-Largo, but it will be part of the fanning that goes on in certain situations.

I assume there are wind changes and things like that that lead the FAA to send planes north, south, whichever way they want to send them.

I don't even know if they take off west. I know they do in Fort Lauderdale, but all of that is up to the FAA. What is at the heart of this case is the interference by the County in violation of the contract and the interference by Mr. Pelly.

Again, it's something we're going to have to prove, did he interfere. If the FAA people say listen, this is it, Mr. Pelly never spoke to us, he had no influence on this at all, we decided we always want to send these planes over Mar-A-Largo, if that is the way this case pans out, it's a different problem.

It's not this case at all, and there is no relief that you could give us in that situation. But that is not what we think this case is going to turn out to be. From the beginning when they signed this agreement,
fanning was the remedy, support fanning. If Mr. Pelly is not supporting fanning, then we have stated a claim for all of these counts because we meet all of the requirements on each of the counts.

THE COURT: Anything that you want to add?
MR. MARION: Just so Your Honor is clear, the County and Mr. Pelly under the federal regulations have an obligation for noise abatement to the community and the surrounding neighborhood of the airport.

He does direct that. He does have influence over whether to go to the FAA and say these are safe fanning flight tracks, is that okay with you. He can go to them and say $I$ have chosen these three or four fanning flight tracts, is that okay with you. Is it safe, yes, then send them there.

He has direct influence over that. I just want Your Honor to be clear on that, the County has direct influence over that.

THE COURT: Suppose Mr. Pelly didn't think it was safe?

MR. MARION: Then why -- I mean, if they used to fan and the FAA said it's safe, that's absurd. He could say that. THE COURT: They used to fan when? MR. MARION: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: They used to fan when?
MR. MARION: In the past. They fanned in the past. They have stopped fanning, and now all of the flights are going over Mar-A-Largo.

THE COURT: Is that as a result of any conditions that have changed, number of flights that are leaving and taking off now or any other condition?

MR. MARION: In fact, the more flights there are, Your Honor, the more reason there is for fanning because you can send them off sooner.

You can send them off and they fan off to the north. You send one off over Mar-A-Largo, and you send one off to the south. That's the reason for fanning. The more increased traffic, the more reason there is for fanning. So all of that is in the control of the County and Mr. Pelly. I don't want you to be misled, they have a lot of influence over flight tracks. The FAA listens to the County airport operator very carefully. We just need to be able to take these people's depositions.

THE COURT: Is there anything stopping you from taking the depositions?

MR. MARION: We want to get past this phase, Your Honor, make sure -- you know, make sure that we got --

THE COURT: How long has this been filed?
MR. MARION: It was filed a year ago.

THE COURT: More than a year ago.
MR. MARION: It was in January.
THE COURT: January?

MR. MARION: Yes. There was a motion to dismiss. There was an amendment to the pleadings, then there was a second motion to dismiss.

We're trying to get past the pleading stage. We have engaged in discovery.

THE COURT: I mean, there is nothing that prevents you from taking discovery.

MR. MARION: No. There is nothing to prevent us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MARION: We have been doing some investigation behind the scenes, I promise you.

THE COURT: I'm sure that you have.
MR. ROGOW: Paragraph eight of the agreement is the point. That's where fanning shows up in paragraph eight, support the fanning.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Sir, $I$ will give you the last word.
MR. PILSK: Thank you, Your Honor. I will try to be brief. I know you have given us an hour generally of your time.

THE COURT: It's interesting issues so go on.

MR. PILSK: Well, thank you.
The first point $I$ want to make is that from everything that plaintiffs have said is they really don't need Mr. Pelly for either claims. They repeatedly described him as an agent of the County, as an employee of the County.

If anything they said is true, you know, we obviously deny, but they can get all the relief they need by simply naming the County as a defendant and not Mr . Pelly. He adds nothing to it.

In a sense it turns the idea of the response of a superior on its head by saying we rather have the inferior employee present to be responsible for the action of the principle instead of the other way around.

They can get all the relief that they need, if they're entitled to anything, from the County without including Mr. Pelly.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Going back to the agreement, does paragraph eight impose any obligations on the County?

MR. PILSK: NO.
THE COURT: None?
MR. PILSK: Just to support the fanning of Stage 2 aircraft. That's an important distinction.

THE COURT: There is an obligation then to support
fanning to some degree, right?
MR. PILSK: Let's look at the language if you don't mind, Your Honor. Shall continue to support the fanning of Stage 2 aircraft under the procedures set forth in the NCP update for PBIA approved by the FAA 1995 until an update is superceded.

THE COURT: The argument is that they have breached that agreement or the County breached that agreement by doing just the opposite, not supporting it but in fact discouraging it.

If that were the case, would that be a breach of the agreement?

MR. PILSK: If they were discouraging the fanning of Stage 2 aircraft, that could be a breach of the agreement.

THE COURT: Isn't that what they have alleged?
MR. PILSK: No, they haven't.
Actually, the word Stage 2 hardly appears in the complaint and that isn't what they have alleged at all.

Moreover, as a matter of law --
THE COURT: What is Stage 2 ?
MR. PILSK: I just was getting to that. So aircraft have been classified over the years in different stages.

They relate roughly speaking to the noise levels on a weight basis. So a bigger aircraft may be rated Stage

1, which is the older, the noisiest class of aircraft. They are no more.

Stage 2 were slightly more modern, slightly less noisy. Now, we have Stage 3, which is really what all the aircraft are today and some Stage 4. This is the point.

In 1990 Congress passed a law, The Airport Noise and Capacity Act that phased out all Stage 2 aircraft over 75,000 pounds over the 190 s so that by January -- excuse me, December 31, 1989 that fleet was phased out. There are no more commercial stage 2 aircraft at all.

Subsequently, and I don't have the cite at the tip of my tongue, the lighter, below 75,000 pound Stage 2 aircraft, have also been phased out. There really aren't any Stage 2 aircraft anymore.

That whole point is moot. All the aircraft taking off from Palm Beach, and certainly all the larger commercial aircraft, are Stage 3 aircraft or Stage 4.

THE COURT: So your position in a nutshell in regard to paragraph eight, to the extent that the County had any obligation at all to support fanning, was only in regard to these Stage 2 aircraft.

They have no obligations under the agreement as it relates to the newer models of the stage 3 aircraft. They can direct every single one of them over Mar-A-Largo
if they want, it wouldn't be a violation of paragraph eight.

Is that your position?
MR. PILSK: That's correct.
Furthermore, and this gets to the point if you go back to the whereas clause which talks generally about the procedures it says very clearly the current preferred flight track, and this is the FAA's preferred flight track, the FAA's order calls for departing and arriving transport category aircraft using PBIA runway 9 left, 27 right to fly the runway extended center line which is approximately 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo.

No fanning for those aircraft, straight out or...
THE COURT: Where are you reading from again?
MR. PILSK: This is the whereas clause on page five of the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Continue again, I'm sorry. MR. PILSK: So my point is that the procedure since at least 1995 and before from the FAA, not from the County, the procedure that the FAA implemented was not to fan. That has been their procedure for decades.

It wasn't changed by the County. When the County did their noise compatibility program, again it's reflected in the whereas clauses -THE COURT: Was that an issue of fact whether it was
or was not changed by the County? I mean, essentially that's what the plaintiff's argument is, give us a chance, let's us show this.

MR. PILSK: Again, the whereas clause that is attached to their complaint makes it clear that first of all, the FAA's order preexisted any recommendations by the County. This was the FAA's decision not to fan. This happened 20 years ago.

I mean, I don't even know if there is a statute of limitations that would bar it. They have not said anything in the complaint about when this happened.

Furthermore, the County's recommendation resulted in a legislative decision about the noise abatement procedures to follow which included using the runway heading procedure instead of fanning, which again is acknowledged in the whereas clauses that while Mr. Trump had opposed the no fanning at the time, that wasn't what the County went with.

So now we're just trying to reargue debates that were won and lost over 20 years ago. Is that what the case is about? You know, that seems to me what they're saying.

This is re-fighting battles that had been won and lost decades go under the skies of this influence which again they keep saying influence, but it's all buzz
words.
There are no facts. There are no specifics. There is no indication of what authority any airport director could possibly have over FAA air traffic controllers other than whispering in their ears. There is no allegation that he ever whispered in anyone's ear.

It really is just bare bones surmise. Airplanes are flying over Mar-A-Largo, there must be some evil reason for it, give us our relief. That's their claim as it stands now with no facts to connect the dots between the aircraft actually flying and the FAA directing the aircraft and any action by any County employee including the airport director.

It's simply insufficient on its face and it should be dismissed. The fact is the suit is a continuation of a lawsuit that was settled in 1995 which raised very similar claims. It filed a very similar suit again in 2010.

It was initially dismissed by Judge Marx. They amended the complaint, refiled it, dismissed it voluntarily after a hearing on a motion to dismiss in 2011. Now, three or four years later they come back and file the same things.

Every time they trim the case down, make the allegations vaguer and vaguer. This isn't a game. We're
talking about serious allegations against long-serving public employees.

It cost public money to defend these claims and for what, so they can amend and make the claims even vaguer again. I think we're at a point, Your Honor, where enough is enough. If they get a right to amend I understand that's their right, but it ought to be with clear direction to allege facts that could possibly support their claim and not bald conclusions.

Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
MS. PETRICK: Your Honor, if I may just offer the Court because you asked the question about is it a question of fact. I just wanted to call to your attention that in the amended complaint on page five, paragraph 18, plaintiffs acknowledge that only Stage 3 operate from Palm Beach International Airport at this point.

Stage 2 have been phased out as a matter of federal law. The other citation that $I$ would like to call to Your Honor's attention is on page seven of the amended complaint, and that is at paragraph 31. That substantive paragraph used to stay that fanning was the appropriate customary procedure.

It was changed after the County's initial motion to
dismiss. And what it now says is that the normal and customary procedure of the departures at PBIA is to have the airplanes depart using routes north of Mar-A-Largo, not fanning.

They have dropped the allegations of fanning in response to our initial motion to dismiss as a matter of their pleading. What has been said today is inconsistent with what the pleadings actually reflect.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I know I said you would have the last word, but I do want to go back to Mr . Rogow just a second and I do want to address that issue, the issue regarding the agreement again.

So if I understand the County's argument, clearly is paragraph eight really is not applicable in this instance because paragraph eight only applies to Stage 2.

MR. ROGOW: The difficulty is that paragraph eight was responsive to what was in existence at that time. So it is true that the times have changed with regard to supporting fanning with regard to Stage 2 aircraft.

So literally the County is correct that there is not Stage 2 aircraft now. Although, these are factual issues it seems to me that need to be ironed out so the Court would have a real basis for making this decision.

THE COURT: I thought it was just argued to me that in your very own complaint you acknowledge that there are
no Stage 2 flights anymore?
MR. ROGOW: You know, we have said that there are no Stage 2 flights. I don't know that for a fact that there are no Stage 2 flights.

I mean, I think Mr. Marion - are there no Stage 2 flights anymore?

MR. MARION: I don't believe there are, Your Honor, any Stage 2, but important to the settlement agreement is that the County agreed to the preferred flight tracks, to maximum adherence to the preferred flight tracks.

If you look at the settlement agreement it defines those as being -- so if you want to read it literally, more than 4,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo is where they're going to adhere to and they're not doing that.

THE COURT: I thought I just heard the agreement says it goes right over Mar-A-Largo?

MR. MARION: No. All you have to do is read the agreement, Your Honor, and you will see.

MR. PILSK: The 4,000 foot refers to the Stage 2 tracks. It says Stage 2 only in parenthesis very clearly.

The other non-Stage 2 flight tracks are runways heading out which is about 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo.

THE COURT: I find that where again?

MR. PILSK: In that same whereas clause on page five of the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: I will take a look at that.

Okay. I appreciate all of your arguments. You didn't disappoint me. It was a very good argument. I appreciate it. There are some very interesting issues.

Whatever $I$ do in this case $I$ feel $I$ want to write about it a little bit and you will have the benefit of my feelings and my reasoning.

Hopefully I won't be too much longer. It shouldn't take me long to get something, but if a long period of time goes by, and by that $I$ mean if in three weeks or so you don't have something from me, I hope it would be shorter than that, I will take no offense to you calling my office and ask where it is.

Sometimes things fall through the cracks. I don't think this will be one of them, but it does happen on occasion. So like I said, I take no offense if you want to know where things are and when you might be expecting an order.

Anything else that $I$ can help you with today?
MR. PILSK: We do have forms orders, which it sounds like you don't need, but we also have envelopes if Your Honor would like.

THE COURT: I'll take the envelopes anyway. We'll

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COUNTY OF PALM BEACH ) my stenographic notes. I financially interested in this action.

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